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I. PROLOGUE 
In an era when women have achieved formal legal equality in the 
labor market and in the family, patriarchal power endures.2 In this Article 
I take on what remains one of the “final frontiers of the multi-century legal 
project”3 of securing women’s economic emancipation: economic abuse.4 
Economic abuse is a form of intimate partner violence that has recently 
begun to generate attention,5 yet still takes a back seat in our collective 
consciousness.6 
Importantly, economic abuse as a socio-legal phenomenon currently 
lacks a specific theory and history with which to deeply understand it. A 
failure to recognize the profound roots enabling economic abuse 
contributes to its perpetuation, trivialization, and marginalization in legal 
thought. Such a failure has broad implications for gender equality. This 
Article offers a history and a theory through which to understand the 
phenomenon’s deep roots, as well as a way to think critically about power 
and equality in family-life in this new, seemingly more egalitarian era.7 
2. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Unequal Terms: Gender, Power, and the Recreation of
Hierarchy, in 69 STUD. IN L., POL., AND SOC’Y 189, 208 (Austin Sarat ed., 2016). 
3. Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100
CAL. L. REV. 951, 955 (2012). 
4. When one thinks of intimate partner violence, one tends to imagine physical violence, such 
as battering, and sexual violence, such as marital rape. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, ET AL., 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 5-6, 162, 202-04 (3rd ed. 2013) (noting 
that while domestic violence is often thought of as primarily physical, other forms of abuse that are 
intended to affect the victims may be involved, but that the legal system often focuses on battering). 
5. Littwin, supra note 3; see Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, 
and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Redefining Harm]. 
6. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 38−42 (2013). 
7. On the need for a theory of power in family-life in this era of formal legal equality, see 
Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 192. Of course, family today takes many forms. However, this 
Article pertains to a heterosexual family and its gendered features, which are not shared by all 
heterosexual families. For the importance of class and race in understanding how inequality is being 
reproduced in families, see JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW 
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 2-7, 77-80 (2014). Similarly, the Article in no way 
seeks to render all women as essentially experiencing the same oppressions, discriminations, liberties, 
and resources, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991), albeit studies of economic abuse 
concerned mostly lower-income women, Littwin, supra note 3, at 962, important studies on the 
intersection of class, race, and disabilities with regards to economic abuse are necessary for future 
examination. Currently, my purpose is to ignite a conversation on some of the shared structural 
features enabling this phenomenon. Similarly, the Article acknowledges the different masculinities at 
play, but focuses on hegemonic masculinity as the most relevant social structure to the perpetuation 
of economic abuse. See Nancy E. Dowd et al., Feminist Legal Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 25 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann 
2
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Awareness and research of economic abuse are relatively new but 
growing, both in law8 and social sciences,9 indicating that myriad forms 
of economic abuse and financial coercion take place within families. Most 
research on economic abuse in the family has focused on intimate 
partners,10 and most research shows that economic abuse is a gendered 
phenomenon11 with devastating consequences for women’s safety, 
agency, and economic sustainability. Economic abuse can occur at any 
stage of a relationship and may take place both independently and in 
conjunction with other types of violence: including physical, sexual, and 
C. McGinley eds., 2012); NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND 
PRIVILEGE 21 (2010) [hereinafter DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION] . Additionally, the division between 
masculinity and femininity in a world in which identity is performed in various ways carries the risk 
of entrenching stereotypes. However, the goal here is to acknowledge that for the most part, economic 
abuse is a gendered phenomenon, and to challenge the gendered premises that enable it to occur. 
8. Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339 (2014); Littwin, supra note 3; Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered 
Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
363 (2013) [hereinafter Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit]; Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course 
in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 145 (2015) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Changing Course]; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5.  
9. Adrienne E. Adams et al., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 563 (2008); Olufunmilayo I. Fawole, Economic Violence to Women and Girls: Is 
it Receiving the Necessary Attention?, 9 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 167 (2008); Judy L. Postmus 
et al., Measuring Economic Abuse in the Lives of Survivors: Revising the Scale of Economic Abuse, 
22 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 692 (2015); Judy L. Postmus et al., Understanding Economic Abuse 
in the Lives of Survivors, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 411, 412 (2012); Cynthia K. Sanders, 
Economic Abuse in the Lives of Women Abused by an Intimate Partner: A Qualitative Study, 21 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 3 (2015); Amanda Mathisen Stylianou et al., Measuring Abusive 
Behaviors: Is Economic Abuse a Unique Form of Abuse?, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3186 
(2013); Prue Cameron, Relationship Problems and Money: Women Talk about Financial Abuse, 
WIRE WOMEN’S INFORMATION 4 (2014), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=3938c7bf-ab6b-4b0e-b2d3-
56177777334b&subId=411337 [http://perma.cc/2ZL2-NRD5]; Marilyn Howard & Amy Skipp, 
Unequal, Trapped and Controlled: Women’s Experience of Financial Abuse and Potential 
Implications for Universal Credit, WOMEN’S AID & TRADE UNION CONGRESS (2015), 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/UnequalTrappedControlled.pdf [http://perma.cc/KF3J-
FKCX]; Nicola Sharp-Jeffs, A Review of Research and Policy on Financial Abuse Within Intimate 
Partner Relationships (Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit (CWASU)), LONDON METRO. UNIV. 
2015, http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/media/london-metropolitan-university/london-met-documents/
faculties/faculty-of-social-sciences-and-humanities/research/child-and-woman-abuse-studies-
unit/Review-of-Research-and-Policy-on-Financial-Abuse.pdf [http://perma.cc/E728-SKRG]. 
10. See supra note 9. For a study focused on elderly abuse, see Thomas L. Hafemeister,
Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Domestic Settings, in ELDER MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT 
AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 382 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace eds., 2003). 
11. Although gender is somewhat controversial in social sciences literature on domestic
violence, it is apparent that dimensions of domestic violence that implicate control are gendered. 
Littwin, supra note 3, at 978–81. See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF 
WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIVES 198–227 (2007); see also Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen 
Side of Domestic Violence, N.Y. ST. B.  J. 40, 41 (2011).   
3
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emotional violence.12 However, it is important to understand economic 
abuse in its own right because it has broad implications for women’s 
economic emancipation more generally, and because without a deeper 
understanding of the determinants of economic abuse, a legal response 
can do little to end the cycle of violence.13 Producing fundamental legal 
change requires understanding the premises underlying the phenomenon 
and then imagining a path towards change.14 
This Article illustrates how economic abuse is socio-legally made 
possible, through the use of new insights derived from the growing 
literature on masculinities theory and through an examination of the legal 
history of male power in the family and the market. Explanations about 
intimate partner violence, mainly physical and sexual abuse, tend to see 
the violence primarily as an exertion of male control over women.15 
Masculinities theory offers an additional theoretical underpinning for 
understanding (rather than accepting) economic abuse, and along with the 
history of breadwinning, points to the deep roots that provide a fertile 
ground for it to occur. It shows that eradicating economic abuse is 
extremely difficult because it is deeply ingrained in the interplay of 
hegemonic masculinity as violent, aggressive, and economically 
domineering and is long embedded in institutions, such as the family and 
the market. 
This Article demonstrates how economic abuse is ingrained in 
notions of violence that are endemic to hegemonic masculinity and linked 
to seemingly more benign notions of male breadwinning, which are also 
closely tied to hegemonic masculinity. Both violence and breadwinning 
have historically been gendered male.16 Dimensions of control and 
12. Chien-Chung Huang et al., Economic Abuse, Physical Violence and Union Formation, 35 
CHILDREN & YOUTH SERV. REV. 780, 785–86 (2013). 
13. See Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political–and Economic: Rethinking Domestic 
Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387 (2007) (arguing that global economic changes, greater economic 
strains, and domestic violence are correlated). 
14. See Kathryn Abrams, Destabilizing Domesticity, 32 CONN. L. REV. 281, 282 (1999). 
15. See Leigh Goodmark, Hands Up at Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police Officers
Who Commit Intimate Partner Abuse, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1183 (2016) [hereinafter Goodmark, Hands 
Up at Home] (explaining that domestic violence of police officers has been linked to masculinity).  
16. Of course, women have always worked, and for decades many have supported themselves 
and their families. See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future: Introducing Constructive 
Feminism for the Twenty-First Century – A New Paradigm for the Family and Medical Leave Act, 6 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 407 (2012) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future]; Arianne Renan 
Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation: Decent Work and Decent Families, 33 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 119, 147 (2012) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family 
Regulation] (distinguishing ideas on marriage based on class, immigration, and work status and 
showing how the male-breadwinner ideal was inscribed in law); Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting 
Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55 
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breadwinning are rife in hegemonic masculinity and have made economic 
abuse seem all the more “natural,” all the less problematic, and extremely 
difficult to overcome. This Article contends that neglecting to account for 
and be cognizant of the significance of hegemonic masculinity and the 
history which enables it, may significantly limit seeing possible avenues 
of potential redress. It is through the complex understanding of economic 
abuse that we can contemplate measures to unravel the bonds between 
masculinities, money, and control that are at the heart of economic abuse. 
Moreover, this Article illustrates how gender identity, which is widely 
recognized as germane to domestic violence, but is also often critiqued for 
its disregard of other structures of power,17 is embedded in a historical, 
socio-legal structure of the market and the family. This Article is therefore 
an effort to bring domestic violence gender-based analysis into a broader 
conversation about the market and the family by making the connection 
between the construction of hegemonic masculinity through these 
institutions and the way law has enabled economic abuse to be 
perpetuated. 
This Article shows how identity is embedded in social structure and 
contends that economic abuse is not merely an “individual” matter 
requiring individual-oriented solutions, but rather a social one, based on a 
particular historically based construction of relationships between the law, 
the market, and the family. This link between identity and social structure 
promotes the possibility to imagine not only individual-based remedies, 
but structural transformations to put an end to economic abuse. Such 
intervention requires an undertaking much larger and more diffuse than 
suggesting a revision to criminal statutes to account for economic abuse 
or an expansion of the purview of civil protection orders, although such 
expansion may be required. I suggest two overarching principles: (1) 
destabilizing hegemonic masculinity, including a relinquishment of 
economic dominance as its staple, on the one hand, and an expansion of 
men’s other productive roles in the family, on the other;18 and (2) 
promoting women’s agency by enhancing their economic and social 
resilience through resources and legal institutions. 
(2016) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII]. Similarly, violence also is not merely the 
province of men, but women are disproportionately facing the threat of violence in their intimate lives. 
See Ruth Colker, Freedom to Choose to Marry, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383 (2016).  
17. Deborah M. Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic
Violence, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 221, 224 (2013). 
18. Some men, of course, may already take important caretaking roles in their families, yet
according to masculinities theory, hegemonic masculinity, nonetheless, pressures men into certain 
gendered roles. See Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 28, and infra parts III and IV. 
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Part II provides an overview of the existing literature on economic 
abuse and describes the social science data on its manifestations, outlining 
its characteristics. Part III provides a legal history of male control within 
the family, pointing to the the market, the family, and the law as 
interdependent institutions that evolved in tandem. It also explains how 
these institutions form the background to the “naturalization” of economic 
abuse and how they currently provide socio-legal structure that enables 
economic control by husbands. It shows that the law’s construction of the 
“ideal worker” norm has contributed to men’s economic supremacy. 
Moreover, the law’s “laissez-faire” approach to financial management 
during marriage has been complacent in the perpetuation of economic 
abuse and is misguided, given new insights from masculinities theories 
that stress the Gordian knot between hegemonic masculinity and 
economic control over the family. These insights, illustrated in Part IV, 
concern the way hegemonic masculinity is constructed through economic 
providership, control, violence, and the differentiation from women. 
Taken together, Parts III and IV explain how economic abuse is enabled 
and provide a way to think about power in this new age of marriage 
equality. Part V points to possible avenues for change and the fundamental 
transformations that ending economic abuse entails. The epilogue, Part 
VI, concludes on an optimistic note, hoping that such transformations are 
within reach. 
II. INTRODUCING ECONOMIC ABUSE
Social scientists have defined economic abuse as tactics that control 
a woman’s ability to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources, thus 
threatening her economic security and potential for self-sufficiency.19 Yet 
economic abuse has largely been ignored by the legal system, which has 
focused on physical and sexual harms, rather than on manifestations of 
coercive control.20 Economic abuse is rarely publicly discussed,21 perhaps 
because it may occur in what otherwise seem like non-violent intimate 
19. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 565. While economic abuse may occur in the reverse, most
of the literature suggests it is usually operated on women. See supra note 11.  
20. GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 38–42. See Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 149 
(“Domestic violence policy has . . . prioritized the narratives of physical violence, crime and danger 
over women’s experience of the broad-range of abuse to which they are subjected.”). 
21. As exceptions, see Ginger Dean, Financial Abuse: 6 Signs and What You Can Do About It, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ginger-dean/financial-abuse-6-
signs-a_b_5627463.html [http://perma.cc/8LFC-7S9T]; Laura Shin, ‘I’ll Take Care Of The Bills’: 
The Slippery Slope Into Financial Abuse, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2015), 
www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/19/ill-take-care-of-the-bills-the-slippery-slope-into-
financial-abuse [http://perma.cc/8JNY-C3V3]. 
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partner relationships. Some claim economic abuse is becoming a bigger 
problem during volatile economic times and that it is now on the rise.22 
Economic abuse often results in growing economic dependence, lack of 
resources, uncertain economic future, homelessness, poverty, and 
decreased health.23 In this Part, I present the practice of economic abuse, 
describe the data accumulated thus far on its myriad manifestations, and 
outline its characteristics. 
Economic abuse can be defined as limiting control over economic 
and financial resources to which a person is entitled, by an intimate 
partner, in order to accomplish control by the partner or make that person 
dependent upon the partner.24 Examples documented include stark 
quotidian images of women being forced to beg for money from their 
husbands,25 being put on allowances even when the family is well-off,26 
or being denied access to basic necessities by the husbands’ withholding 
of them under lock and key.27 Common manifestations of economic abuse 
may include forbidding work, sabotaging employment opportunities, 
preventing the abused partner from attending job training or advancement 
opportunities, controlling how money is spent, not allowing the abused 
partner access to bank accounts or credit cards, restricting access to 
financial information, liquidating joint accounts, charging items on the 
abused partner’s credit cards, not consulting the abused partner in 
investment or banking decisions, forcing the abused partner to run up 
large amounts of debt on joint accounts, hiding assets and financial 
resources, or forcing the abused partner to turn over public benefits.28 
22. Pollet, supra note 11, at 41. See Scott M. Stringer, Economic Abuse: Untold Cost of
Domestic Violence, OFFICE OF THE MANHATTAN BOROUGH PRESIDENT, (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/ilr.cornell.edu/files/Economic-Abuse-Untold-Cost-of-DV.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8CJN-2PDT]. 
23. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 568; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1123. Some 
note the special susceptibility of immigrant women, who have limited economic resources, limited 
English proficiency, weak connections to their community, or weak networks of support to economic 
abuse. See Conner, supra note 8. But see Pollet, supra note 11 (arguing economic abuse affects 
women of all social strata). 
24. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 565; see Maureen Outlaw, No One Type of Intimate Partner 
Abuse: Exploring Physical and Non-Physical Abuse Among Intimate Partners, 24 J. FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 263 (2009). 
25. Although economic abuse affects non-married partners, most literature refers to
husbands/wives. Outlaw, supra note 24.  
26. Howard & Skipp, supra note 9; see Susan Lloyd & Nina Taluc, The Effects of Male
Violence on Female Employment, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 370 (1999); Angela M. Moe & 
Myrtle P. Bell, Abject Economics: The Effects of Battering and Violence on Women’s Work and 
Employability, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 29 (2004). 
27. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1109. 
28. See Conner, supra note 8, at 364–66; Littwin, supra note 3, at 983–92; About Financial
Abuse, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://nnedv.org/content/about-financial-
7
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Other features include preventing financial support (which may be 
necessary for leading a reasonable lifestyle), forcing the abused partner to 
cede control of her assets, preventing the abused partner from making 
decisions in relation to the household economy, and creating debts by one 
partner while imposing them on the abused partner.29 Economic abuse 
may manifest in registering all the family property in the name of only 
one of the spouses, stealing money and destroying family assets, 
withholding information about money, not complying with one’s 
undertaking to care for children, and imposing the financial burden on the 
caretaking party.30 Such features often have long term effects on women’s 
employment, credit scores, and financial sustainability. 
These features have been organized by social scientists into three 
main categories.31 The first is restrictions on accumulating resources. This 
category includes behaviors that prevent the abused partner from earning 
a living with her own capabilities. At times, the abused partner is 
prevented by means of an outright restriction, and other times by means 
of thwarting her attempts to arrive at work interviews, preventing the 
issuance of a driver’s license, imposing child-care responsibilities, 
restricting her ability to procure financial resources independently, or to 
acquire education.32 The second category is restrictions on the use of 
available resources and prevention of information.33 Examples of this 
category include restricting the abused partner from withdrawing cash 
from joint accounts, or allocating small amounts of money to her while 
preventing access to such accounts; restricting the use of a car, credit card, 
or check book; and concealing information concerning the financial 
situation of the spouses. The third category of economic abuse includes 
abuse/  [http://perma.cc/YJ6X-7WWN] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); see also Economic Abuse Fact 
Sheet, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.mmgconnect.com/
projects/userfiles/file/dce-stop_now/ncadv_economic_abuse_fact_sheet.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VK5W-2KXS] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); Research Report from Eve Buzawa, 
Gerald T. Hotaling, Andrew Klein, & James Byrne, Response to Domestic Violence in a Pro-Active 
Court Setting—Final Report, to U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Mar. 15, 2000) (unpublished report); Cynthia K. 
Sanders, Domestic Violence, Economic Abuse, and Implications of a Program for Building Economic 
Resources for Low-Income Women: Findings from Interviews with Participants in a Women’s 
Economic Action Program, CTR. SOC. DEV., GEORGE WARREN BROWN SCH. SOC. WORK (Apr. 
2007), https://csd.wustl.edu/publications/documents/rp07-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/YQN3-KEK5]. 
29. Cameron, supra note 9, at 5. See Conner, supra note 8; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra 
note 5. 
30. Pollet, supra note 11, at 41. See Moving Ahead Through Financial Management, 
ALLSTATE FOUND. (May 2010), http://purplepurse.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
moving_ahead_through_financial_management_module_two.pdf [http://perma.cc/TU4A-Q49B].  
31. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 563, 565–67.
32. Adams et al., supra note 9, at 565.
33. Id. at 566. 
8
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exploitation of resources.34 This category consists of stealing family 
money, betting on it, and destroying property. Such exploitation can also 
manifest itself in forcing the abused partner to work while controlling her 
earnings35 or creating a coerced debt (a nonconsensual, credit-related 
transaction which includes taking out credit cards in a partner’s name); 
forcing her to take out a loan or sign a quitclaim deed to a home; or 
excessively charging a partner’s credit card.36 The common denominator 
of all these forms of behavior is that the spouse creates an increased 
dependence of the abused partner on her spouse, and also that these 
behaviors constitute a means for continuing such dependence. 
This phenomenon is not unique to the United States. 
Notwithstanding the cultural and social variations, economic abuse is 
increasingly gaining recognition as a social problem in countries as 
34. Id. at 567.
35. Id. at 566. 
36. Littwin, supra note 3, at 986–1000. 
9
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diverse as Australia,37 Egypt,38 England,39 Israel,40 Lebanon,41 and 
Turkey,42 yet with the core centrality of gender apparent. Within the 
37. In Australia, more than 200 documented cases’ descriptions were remarkably alike; thus,
for example, on a regular basis a woman was prevented from driving a car to visit friends or family 
members because of the costs of gas; a women was required to keep a book accounting for every 
dollar spent; and a mother of three was not allowed to do the shopping for the household, and when 
she was allowed her husband would check each item in the shopping cart and would decide which 
goods were necessary to be bought. Women also reported that their spouses would use all their 
financial resources for gambling purposes. See Cameron, supra note 9. Another study in Australia 
discovered a phenomenon of men who had deprived their spouses of money to the point where they 
had no possibility of buying food, clothing, hygienic products, and travelling on public transport. It 
was further discovered that men made use of the family money for themselves, pursuant to their wish 
alone, to the extent that the wife was barred from making any financial decisions. Elizabeth Branigan, 
“His Money or Our Money?” Financial Abuse of Women in Intimate Partner Relationships, REPORT 
BY THE COBURG BRUNSWICK CMTY. LEGAL & FIN. COUNSELLING CTR. INC. 20–22 (2004), 
www.communitylaw.org.au/clc_morelandhome/cb_pages/images/238_Financial_Abuse_Projec.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/NXS4-DHCX]. 
38. A study conducted in Egypt among women who experienced economic abuse discovered
that 25% of the women reported that their spouse had forced them to take out a loan for family 
purposes in their names exclusively, and 14% of the women said that their spouses refused to 
withdraw money for their personal expenses. Ibrahim F. Kharboush et al., Spousal Violence in Egypt, 
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Sept. 2010), http://www.prb.org/pdf10/spousalviolence-
egypt.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5S7-VNSH]; Jinan Usta et al., Economic Abuse in Lebanon: Experiences 
and Perceptions, 19 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 356, 358 (2013). 
39. In England, women stated that when they were allowed to use credit they were forced to
explain and justify every charge, and they were constantly in fear since their needs and the reasons 
they gave for them were never considered justifiable reasons in the eyes of their spouses. There were 
also descriptions of cases where women worked and their husbands would react with jealousy and 
suspicion, confiscating their credit cards while allocating them a daily cash allowance. When 
interviewees were asked how the economic abuse had expressed itself, 76% of them responded that 
their spouses concealed financial information from them, 68% noted that important financial 
decisions were passed without their knowledge, 65% were required to detail how they spent their 
money, and 54% described how their spouses forced them to ask them for money when they needed 
it. Howard & Skipp, supra note 9, at 22–23, 29. 
40. In Israel, a survey found that 5% of the women who live with spouses and who run a joint 
household report that they are not free to independently manage their own or the joint bank account, 
even when it comes to daily expenses such as buying food and medicine; 21% of those surveyed 
reported that their spouses examine their economic expenses; and 9% of those surveyed noted that 
they required the approval of their spouse to make any purchase or to buy anything; and 14% noted 
that they had no information about their spouses’ income and property. Other studies reveal that 
among applications for social services in the hospitals and in the community with respect to spousal 
violence, approximately 4% of the applicants complained about economic abuse and/or withholding 
economic rights. See Arianne Renan Barzilay & Shirley Youseri, Economic Abuse in the Family, 39 
TEL AVIV L. REV. 613 (2016) (on file with author). 
41. A study conducted among women in Lebanon found that 45% of the women who were
interviewed experienced violence which was expressed in an economic way on the part of their 
spouse. Usta et al., supra note 38, at 358. 
42. In a study in Turkey in which more than one thousand women took part, it was discovered
that approximately 25% of them experienced or were experiencing economic abuse. Taner Akar et 
al., The Prevalence of Domestic Violence Against Women Among a Group Woman: Ankara, Turkey: 
Domestic Violence Against Women in Ankara, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 449, 451 (2010). 
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framework of the family, economic abuse has gender features, and most 
studies show that the man was preventing the woman from access to the 
money.43 
Economic abuse has begun to gain recognition as a genuine form of 
domestic violence. The U.S. Department of Justice curtly includes it in its 
definition of domestic violence.44 Yet economic abuse remains rather 
peripheral in domestic violence law, policy, and scholarship, which still 
primarily focuses on physical and sexual harms.45 Economic abuse lacks 
a history and a theory with which to understand it, which may inform 
possible avenues of redress. Scholars have claimed that economic abuse 
is a real harm to women, and several organizations46 have responded by 
articulating the manifestations of economic abuse. However, economic 
abuse still suffers marginal recognition at best. This may be because, 
unlike physical domestic violence, which we have been educated on by 
feminist lawmaking to reject as a prerogative of the marital relationship,47 
economic abuse seems more benign, more ordinary, and even more 
natural (except perhaps in circumstances when accompanied by physical 
or sexual harm). Its seemingly naturalness stems from its deep roots in 
both coverture and the history of gender roles in the market and in the 
family. I now turn to this history.48 
43. Pollet, supra note 11, at 41. There were also few reported cases of same-sex economic
abuse. See Cameron, supra note 9, at 15.  
44. It defines domestic violence as “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is
used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner. Domestic 
violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions 
that influence another person. This includes any behaviors that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate, 
isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound someone.” Domestic 
Violence, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence 
[http://perma.cc/3ECH-7EJF] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).  
45. On the marginal place of economic abuse, see GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 38–42; 
Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8. 
46. These include the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Home, NAT’L COAL.
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/ [http://perma.cc/MM8X-ZMSP] (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2016); Redevelopment Opportunities for Women’s Economic Action (REAP) in St. Louis, 
Missouri, Home, FAMILY RES. CTR., https://www.frcmo.org/services/row/ [http://perma.cc/9ZJ4-
EB8G] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016); The Allstate Foundation in partnership with the National Network 
to End Violence (NNEDV); NNEDV & The Allstate Foundation Celebrate 10 Years of Economic 
Empowerment Programs for Survivors, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
https://nnedv.org/latest_update/nnedv-the-allstate-foundation-celebrate-10-years-of-economic-
empowerment-programs-for-survivors/ [http://perma.cc/Y37B-JH2R] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).  
47. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 5, 13-16, 
20 (2000).  
48. A comprehensive history of women’s subordination in the family and the market since
coverture is beyond the scope of this Article. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF 
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 3, 93-94 (2000); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: 
WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 22 (2001); 
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III. BETWEEN COVERTURE AND BREADWINNING
The family, the market, and the law are interrelated institutions. This 
Part shows that economic abuse is a remnant of coverture ideology, 
modified through the supremacy of the male-breadwinner/female-
dependent model, and that it is enabled through the primacy of “ideal-
worker” norms and a general legal aversion to interfere in the private 
financial matters in an ongoing marriage. It seems that an important part 
of the marginalization of economic abuse and its trivialization stems from 
two basic assumptions, which are still significantly conceived of as 
natural: (1) the family as a private, autonomous space in which 
government should not intervene,49 and (2) the conception of the husband 
as the main breadwinner and therefore the domineering economic 
figure.50 These two assumptions, both the myth of the family as a private 
autonomous space and the conception of the husband as financial 
controller, are related to the age-old legal doctrine of coverture, features 
of which continue to reverberate still today.51 The marginal recognition of 
economic abuse in the legal system52 is entrenched in the fear of entering 
into the private sphere of the family and “interfering” with the intimate 
economic relationship, where the husband’s day-to-day control of the 
family’s finances is conceived as natural and generally inappropriate for 
judicial intervention. 
Historically, the law has formed gendered identities for wives and 
husbands.53 Marriage was a profoundly hierarchical relationship.54 The 
coverture doctrine that existed in Anglo-American law for centuries 
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 93-166 (2000); Deborah Dinner, The 
Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. 
REV. 415 (2011). My aim is to highlight the features in the history of gender, law, work, and family 
that have allowed and continue to enable economic abuse to take hold.   
49. See LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
LAW 40 (2002). For the theoretical incoherence of the non-intervention doctrine, see Frances E. Olsen, 
The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985). For the historical 
inaccuracy of this myth, see Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16 
(showing that labor regulation has constructed a particular family model).  
50. Kathryn Abrams has critiqued the “widely-held” notion that when the husband is the
primary wage earner and the wife does the lion’s share of family-care work, the man “owns” the 
property. Abrams, supra note 14, at 281. 
51. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, 97–120 (2014); Reva B. Siegel, The 
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. 
L.J. 2127 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, The Modernization of Martial Status Law]; Reva B. Siegel, “The 
Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) [hereinafter 
Siegel, The Rule of Love].  
52. See supra note 200 and infra notes 220-264. 
53. Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 186 (2000). 
54. HARTOG, supra note 48, at 2. 
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transformed a man and a woman who entered in marriage into husband 
and wife.55 Marriage consolidated the legal persona of both individuals 
into the legal persona of the husband. The wife became “covered” by her 
husband and was submerged into his legal existence. The significance of 
this submergence, inter alia, was that the wife lost control of her property, 
and control of her property and performance of activities with her 
financial resources was granted to the husband,56 who in turn was required 
to support her.57 
For generations, under the widespread family model, the husband 
acquired his wife and her services, and his role was to provide for her.58 
The coverture doctrine enabled physical violence in the family as a 
“natural” offshoot thereof. Because the husband was responsible for his 
wife’s behavior, he was given the power to “educate” her, even by 
physical force.59 Anglo-American common law authorized a husband to 
strike his wife so long as he did not cause her permanent damage, as an 
aspect of male control of the family.60 Violence was protected from legal 
intervention by the husband’s prerogative and by the veil of family 
privacy.61 The idea of family privacy over ongoing mundane family 
affairs perpetuated the gendered power relationship and contributed to the 
subjugation of women by men within the family.62 The feminist struggle, 
regarding physical and sexual abuse, raised awareness to the need to 
understand what was happening in the domestic sphere.63 Ultimately, it 
was established that the husband has no right to act with physical violence 
toward his wife. However, the courts still continued to relate differently 
to the striking of a woman within the framework of marriage, for fear of 
interfering in the privacy of the family.64 Hence, through the doctrine of 
55. “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated 
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything.” WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1765). 
56. HARTOG, supra note 48, at 93–106.
57. Id. at 115–18, 136–37.
58. Zvi Triger, Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for Critical Family Law, 
13 THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN L. 361, 367–68 (2012). 
59. HARTOG, supra note 48, at 115–16. 
60. Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 51, at 2118. 
61. Id. at 2196–206. 
62. SCHNEIDER, supra note 47, at 87. 
63. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 4 (2009). 
64. Littwin, supra note 3, at 955–57. 
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coverture and its ideological remnants, such as the assumption of family 
autonomy, different types of violence in the family have been condoned.65 
Even after coverture was critiqued by feminists and was changed as 
a result of their efforts and other socio-economic forces,66 courts have 
continued to invoke it in “an idiom peculiar to the industrial era,”67 
defining the role of the husband in the family as the family breadwinner.68 
Reva Siegel notes that “notwithstanding the putative abolition of 
coverture, women in the industrial era found themselves economically 
disempowered in marriage and impoverished at divorce—and still find 
themselves so today.”69 She argues that the changes in that antiquated 
body of law were merely modernized to enable the continuation of 
regulated gender relations.70 While coverture doctrine formally changed, 
the deep conception of the husband’s financial control of family assets has 
continued to dominate, given most husbands’ traditional breadwinning 
roles. These roles were constructed via the Industrial Revolution, which 
created a separation between the domestic-private sphere and the market-
public sphere.71 
The Industrial Revolution transformed the majority of working 
people from self-employed agricultural workers to wage earners working 
for large industrial firms.72 Unlike the pre-industrial, agrarian era, in 
which all members of the family worked together to sustain the family, 
the Industrial Revolution invented an iconic figure of dependency—the 
housewife.73 This figure melded women’s traditional sociological and 
65. Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 51, at 2150-74. 
66. Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CAL. L.
REV. CIR. 126 (2015).  
67. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 51, at 2129. 
68. Id. at 2127 (citing Lewis v. Lewis, 245 S.W. 509, 511 (Ky. 1922)), “[A]t common law the 
husband and wife are under obligation to each other to perform certain duties. The husband to bring 
home the bacon, so to speak, and to furnish a home, while on the wife devolved the duty to keep said 
home in a habitable condition.”). 
69. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 51, at 2131. 
70. Id. at 2132, 2140. See Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (explaining that the 
women’s rights movement originally sought to abolish the doctrine of marital service by enacting 
joint property laws that would give husbands and wives equal rights in family assets). 
71. See Cahn, supra note 53. For a critique of the separation narrative, see HASDAY, supra note 
51, at 67–96; Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499–501, 1507 (1983). 
72. See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Women at Work: Towards an Inclusive Narrative of the Rise 
of the Regulatory State, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 169, 175 (2008) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, 
Women at Work]. 
73. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the
U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 318 (1994).  
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political subordination with new economic dependence.74 The Industrial 
Revolution reorganized work and family and created a stark line between 
the public and the private spheres.75 Men and women were engaged in 
separate spheres of activity in the nineteenth century: men in the market, 
business, and the professions, and women in the home.76 Women were 
largely “drafted” into motherhood and family-care, while men’s 
caretaking was “voluntary.”77 The male-breadwinner/woman-dependent 
model established a gender system that sent men to the marketplace while 
requiring women to perform unpaid domestic work.78 Family-care work 
and productive work became separated, rendering women’s work 
economically invisible and making them economically dependent on the 
earnings of men.79 Subsequently and pragmatically that usually meant that 
authority over resources and allocation of duties rested with the 
husband.80 Although the husband-breadwinner/wife-dependent model 
was unrealistic for many groups,81 this model assumed a “naturalness,” 
which was institutionalized and supported by the law,82 with the marriage 
relationship constituting a pillar of the family.83 
74. Id. Although not all families conformed to this ideal, especially many working-class, 
immigrants, and black women, whom have long worked in the market. See LYNN Y. WEINER, FROM 
WORKING GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER: THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1820-
1980 13–30 (1985); Renan Barzilay, Women at Work, supra note 72, at 175; Marion Crain, “Where 
Have All the Cowboys Gone?” Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1877, 1903 (1999). 
75. JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES: STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE-
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 8 (1998); see Pierre Bourdieu, On the Family as a Realized 
Category, 13 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 19, 20–21 (1996) (considering the family “a well-founded 
fiction”); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1 (1996). 
76. Of course, some women, particularly immigrant, black, and working-class women had
worked in the marketplace. See JOANNE J. MEYEROWITZ, WOMEN ADRIFT: INDEPENDENT WAGE 
EARNERS IN CHICAGO 1880-1930, at XVII (1988); WEINER, supra note 74, at 4. 
77. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1451-57 (1991). 
78. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 120, 128 (20th anniversary ed. 2003); Laura T. Kessler, Feminism for Everyone, 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 679, 686 (2011) (discussing the price women pay for domesticity); Laura T. 
Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2005) (explaining the 
impracticalities of the family wage system). 
79. STACEY, supra note 75, at 8 (“Women devoted increased attention to nurturing fewer . . . 
children as mothering came to be . . . [a] demanding vocation [and] . . . [l]ove and companionship 
became the ideal purposes of marriages . . . .”). 
80. Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 127. 
81. STACEY, supra note 75, at 5–10. 
82. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 150 (1995). 
83. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1251–
52 (2010).  
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Women have historically been marginalized and excluded from the 
locus of money-making. Although women have always worked inside the 
home, and increasingly in the market, their market work was often 
considered a mere detour until marriage.84 When women engaged in 
marketplace labor they were paid less than men for the same jobs. Wages 
were for the breadwinners: men supporting their families.85 Women were 
not considered real workers or family breadwinners deserving of adequate 
wages. Money women earned in the market was considered “special 
money,” coined as “pin money” or “allowance,” marking it as different 
from wages.86 Even after women had begun to enter in growing numbers 
into the paid workforce in the early decades of the twentieth century,87 
during times of economic downturn, the focus of public concern about 
unemployment was on working men, who were understood as providers 
for their families.88 Scholars contend that the New Deal helped re-erect 
the husband’s place in the family as the necessary breadwinner and 
provider:89 laws were aimed at breadwinners and heads of families, 
resting on the assumption that women were not real workers and family 
providers.90 To this day, scholars note that the labor market is gendered 
male. It is premised on an “ideal worker,” one that is unencumbered by 
familial caregiving responsibilities and is free to work long hours at any 
time.91 Law itself has structured workplace norms that favor “ideal 
workers,” and has largely failed to accommodate those with family-care 
responsibility.92 Today, concentration of wealth and power in the market 
is linked to top executive ranks and the most lucrative professions—which 
are still disproportionately male.93 Despite advances in women’s 
84. Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 133, 145. 
85. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES 7 (updated ed. 1990); Cahn, supra note 53, at 191. 
86. Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money: “Special Monies,” 95 AM. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 342, 344 (1989).  
87. Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 140. 
88. See COTT, supra note 48, at 172. 
89. Id. at 158, 172–74; Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 
16, at 143. 
90. See Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation, supra note 16, at 144–45. 
91. In regards to the ideal worker norm, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY 
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 20 (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, 
UNBENDING GENDER]. 
92. Id.; Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future, supra note 16; Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title
VII, supra note 16; Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003). 
93. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 190. 
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marketplace labor participation and earning,94 women still earn less than 
men, and mothers, in particular, have even lower earnings.95 
Within marriage, women are disproportionately the individuals who 
provide care to others.96 Men still take fewer parental leaves and actual 
parental roles have changed relatively little.97 Mothers and caregivers are 
often marginalized in the workforce because of “ideal worker” norms of 
extremely long hours that assume a full-time family caretaker at home, 
and are also marginalized in their families because of the notion that he 
who earns the money owns it. As Kathryn Abrams observed, it is a widely 
held premise or assumption that when the husband is the primary wage 
earner and the wife does the lion’s share of family-care work, the man 
“owns” the property.98 Even as women earn more money, these deep-
rooted assumptions about men’s economic roles and privileges seem to 
continue. 
As the twentieth century neared a close, a postindustrial labor market 
enmeshed in a postindustrial society gave increasing rise to post-modern 
families.99 Today, law and society have opened up a diverse array of 
familial relationships, as same-sex partnerships, single-parent households, 
and dual-earner households are becoming increasingly common.100 Yet, 
for most heterosexual relationships, elements of the traditional family 
have remained intact. Many feminists have identified caregiving as a 
practice to which a wide range of women are still socialized.101 Women 
still conduct more family-care work and earn less in the market than men, 
thus making them more dependent on male earners.102 The current 
94. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U.  L. REV. 995 (2015) 
(noting the progress that women have made in the labor market). The gaps have nonetheless narrowed 
mostly at the lower paying, non-skilled jobs. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 197.  
95. Cahn, supra note 53, at 188. 
96. Colker, supra note 16, at 388. 
97. Cahn, supra note 53, at 184. Notwithstanding changes from previous generations, and
changes due to times of economic unrest, see KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE 
BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY 16-18, 179-88 (2013) (asserting that economic and 
cultural changes have transformed the meaning of fatherhood among the urban poor). 
98. Abrams, supra note 14, at 281–82. 
99. STACEY, supra note 75, at 16–17. 
 100.  Ariela R. Dubler, Constructing the Modern American Family: The Stories of Troxel v. 
Granville, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 95, 111 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008). 
 101.  FINEMAN, supra note 82, at 7-9, 47-48; Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency:
Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 816 (1999) [hereinafter 
Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency].  
 102.  See Heather Boushey, The New Breadwinners, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, at 32 (2009), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/chapters/
economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/PW4F-LH4P] (stating that women still conduct more family-care work 
and earn less in the market than men). 
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marketplace workforce includes significantly larger numbers of fathers 
than mothers with children under eighteen years old,103 although single-
parent families are predominantly led by females.104 In financially 
rewarding industries, workplace culture and the practice of working 
extremely long hours remain intact.105 More generally, the hours now 
worked by the average American worker equate to roughly five extra 
workweeks a year for the Swedish worker, and are substantially more than 
those worked by workers in Canada, Germany, or France.106 American 
employment structures have largely remained premised on the male-
breadwinner family model, which assumes a caregiver at home, thus 
furthering the prevalence of “ideal worker” norms.107 Part-time and 
flexible work, often unaccompanied by benefits, is severely penalized 
financially and unavailable for many rewarding jobs.108 
Notwithstanding significant changes, remnants of coverture continue 
to reverberate today.109 The history of casting males as breadwinners, in 
which women belonged to the domestic sphere and men to the market 
sphere, strengthened the husband’s financial control in the family, making 
the hetero-normative family model one in which female dependency 
persists.110 It emerges therefore, that in the past the financial control of the 
husband in the family was understood as natural owing to the coverture 
doctrine, while nowadays, in a significant sense, it is still conceived of as 
natural owing to the establishment of the husband as the main 
breadwinner. Male domination over economic resources continues to fuel 
intimate partner violence in general,111 and more specifically makes 
 103.  See HILDA L. SOLIS & KEITH HALL, U.S. DEP’T LABOR & U.S. BUREAU LABOR 
STATISTICS, REPORT 1018, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 13 (2009), 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/464C-MYQD]; U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE & EXEC. OF OFFICE THE PRESIDENT, WOMEN IN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND 
ECON. WELL-BEING 27 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
Women_in_America.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3BQ-Y7Z2] [hereinafter WOMEN IN AMERICA]. 
104.  WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 103, at 13. 
 105.  See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR 
RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 59 (2003).  
106.  Statistical Index, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2012), 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS [http://perma.cc/HX2M-N6JA]. 
107.  See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 91, at 20. 
 108.  See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 105, at 23–24; Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the
Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283 (2003). 
109.  HASDAY, supra note 51, at 97–120; Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law, 
supra note 51, at 2127 ; Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 51, at 2117. 
 110.  Arianne Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own, Baby: Reflections on Capato’s Legacy, 46 
IND. L. REV. 557, 570 (2013) [hereinafter Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own]; Fraser & Gordon, 
supra note 73, at 318; STACY, supra note 75, at 8. 
111.  Conner, supra note 8, at 363; Pollet, supra note 11, at 41.  
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economic abuse seem natural and benign. Although unmarried 
perpetrators may inflict economic abuse, features of marriage, such as 
joint bank accounts, property titled only in a husband’s name,112 and the 
general convention of “what’s mine is yours” may make economic abuse 
easier to carry out and much harder to resist. 
Law has played a significant role in the perpetuation of economic 
abuse. Notwithstanding that women have made progress in the workforce 
by narrowing some income and earnings gaps between the sexes,113 what 
happens outside the home does not linearly translate into what happens 
inside the home because women’s earning of money does not necessarily 
lead to them controlling income.114 Sociologists note that “[r]egardless of 
how money is earned outside the home, only a minority of households 
manage money within the home in ways that equitably benefit both 
women and men,”115 and that most families’ money management work to 
the disadvantage of women.116 Today women enter into contracts, own 
property, and earn wages, but as Angela Littwin noticed, “although the 
law retreated from its de jure commitment to male economic supremacy, 
it does not monitor de facto economic rights husbands and wives 
conferred on each other during their marriages.”117 Importantly, during a 
112.  Conner, supra note 8, at 363; Sanders, supra note 28, at 32.  
 113.  Elizabeth R. Carter, The Illusion of Equality: The Failure of the Community Property
Reform to Achieve Management Equality, 48 IND. L. REV. 853, 853 (2015). 
114.  Catherine T. Kenney, The Power of the Purse: Allocative Systems and Inequality in Couple 
Households, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 354, 359–62 (2006) (explaining that many women, already 
disadvantaged in earnings, either absolutely or relative to their partners, are in couples in which men’s 
control over or withholding of income may reproduce or exacerbate their earnings disadvantage). 
 115.  Jeffrey Dew et al., Examining the Relationship Between Financial Issues and Divorce, 61 
FAM. REL. 615, 617 (2012). 
116.  Kenney, supra note 114, at 354; Carter, supra note 113, at 853-54. 
 117.  Littwin, supra note 3, at 955. Discriminatory “head-and-master” laws which de jure 
granted the husband the exclusive right to manage and control marital property in both community 
property and title states were successfully challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Marsha Levick, The Era and Family Law: Making 
Equality Work for Men and Women, 23 J. FAM. L. 521, 539 (1984). Yet because of the doctrine of 
marital privacy, courts generally do not intervene in families’ decision-making practices even when 
the husband is the one making these decisions, rather than the family. Littwin, supra note 3, at 983–
85. The famous case of McGuire v. McGuire (59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953)), which declined to
intervene when a husband refused to purchase more than bare necessities for his wife, is still 
representative of the courts’ inclination today. Littwin, supra note 3, at 984. Yet others have noted 
that “much of recent family law has grown from rights developed under the family privacy theory, 
which positively permits pluralism and a diversity of family forms to flourish.” Jane K. Stoever, 
Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1015, 1039 (2014). Specifically, the doctrine of marital privacy has afforded women a number of 
crucial protections, including access to abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that 
the right to choose abortion is premised on right to privacy), and birth control, see Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that privacy rights grant a right to use contraceptives). For 
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marriage, in common law states, the spouse that owns title controls the 
assets, and given that men generally earn more money than women in the 
market, men control most assets in the home.118 Resource allocation 
within the family thus “naturally” follows market outcomes.119 
The law remains generally supportive of earner-husbands’ decisions 
on how to allocate resources within the family.120 Even divorce, which 
formally enables judicial distribution of property, usually results in each 
party coming away from the marriage to return to the marketplace to make 
their own way.121 The law in most common law states perpetuates this 
problem122 by taking a hands-off approach on how spouses manage 
money once it is brought into the home.123 The practical and predictable 
consequence of this “laissez-faire” approach is that the existing gender 
power gap remains intact within heterosexual couples.124 Anne Alstott has 
posited that such privileging of private ordering without the right to 
challenge market outcomes is itself an outcome of neoliberalism’s 
architecture of tragedies as private.125 This architecture coincides with 
courts’ aversion to micromanage financial decisions during marriage.126 
a critique arguing that these reproductive rights cases should not have been decided on privacy 
grounds but rather on the basis of equality, see Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male 
Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 52–53 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia 
Hennessey eds., 1984).   
118.  Cahn, supra note 53, at 187.  
 119.  Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire 
Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 28 (2014). 
120.  Id. at 33. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of 
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 998 (1995). 
121.  Alstott, supra note 119, at 34–35. 
 122.  Carter, supra note 113, at 854. Community property states (in which the couple owns 
marital assets jointly during the marriage) are not that different in this respect. In the past, formal 
rules of male superiority in management of the community assets were common, making the husband 
the sole manager of the property. Over time, the community property states began imposing more 
meaningful limitations to the husband’s control by granting the wife some power to veto important 
transactions and de jure male preference (the old head-and-master laws) was completely abandoned 
by the 1980s. Yet, the gender neutral property management systems put instead, did not significantly 
benefit women, because “money management remains a highly gendered activity—one that typically 
operates to the disadvantage of the wife.” Id. at 863–70.  
123.  Alstott, supra note 119, at 33–34; Carter, supra note 113, at 854. 
124.  Alstott, supra note 119, at 33–34; Carter, supra note 113, at 854; Littwin, supra note 3, at 
955. 
 125.  Alstott, supra note 119, at 33. While Alstott notes domestic violence as an exception, 
economic abuse is largely unrecognized and therefore her assertion remains representative in our 
context. 
 126.  On courts’ aversion to micromanage marriage, see Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains
in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225 (2011); Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful 
Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 
83 OR. L. REV. 945, 949 (2004) (“[F]amily law is largely premised on the belief that only minimal 
state intervention is warranted absent the most egregious, near-fatal conduct, with the greatest 
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The fact that the law does not de facto monitor the economic 
allocations during marriage makes the legal system rely, to a significant 
extent, on “male cooperation in the project of female economic 
independence.”127 Given new insights from masculinities theory, this 
reliance seems grossly misguided. Insights from masculinities theory 
demonstrate the inextricable relationship between economic control and 
men’s sense of their masculinity, suggesting that relinquishing such power 
is intrinsically tied to a denunciation of men’s sense of themselves as 
masculine. It is these insights that the next Part explains. 
IV. MASCULINITIES AND ECONOMIC ABUSE
A. Preliminary Skepticism 
A preliminary question may be asked: Why should masculinities 
theory be relevant to a phenomenon that primarily negatively affects 
women when one of the professed goals of masculinities theory is 
bringing attention to men, their experiences, and how they are 
constructed?128 Yet it is exactly by coming to terms with the effects of 
masculinities on gender relationships that masculinities theory, which 
centers on men and their relationships among themselves almost 
exclusively,129 can produce insights that might help promote gender 
equality for both men and women. Moreover, even masculinities scholars 
do not suggest turning away from women because gender power dynamics 
are asymmetrical,130 and because of the fear that masculinities theory 
would be used to reproduce patriarchy rather than eradicate it.131 On the 
other hand, feminist theorists might wonder why masculinities theory 
should be taken into account at all and why it is necessary to unpack 
economic abuse through the lens of masculinities. A possible response is 
that masculinities theory may teach us vital lessons about how men 
acquire control and subjugate their subordinates. This understanding is an 
emphasis on no-fault divorce as the means to expeditious resolution of the cases.”). 
127.  Littwin, supra note 3, at 955. 
 128.  Martha Albertson Fineman has more broadly questioned the use of identity-based theories 
as equality enhancing mechanisms. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism and Masculinities: 
Questioning the Lure of Multiple Identities, in EXPLORING MASCULINITIES: FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY REFLECTIONS 16 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Michael Thomson eds., 2013); Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619 (2013). 
129.  Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 27. 
130.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 65.   
131.  Id. at 105–20; Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis and 
Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415, 419 (2010) [hereinafter Dowd, Asking the Man 
Question]. 
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important step in dismantling patriarchy and promoting gender 
equality.132 It may be helpful for two additional, related reasons. First, 
discussing masculinities theory seems like a promising opportunity to 
bring men on board with the gender equality project. Such discussion may 
promote awareness to the prices men pay for gender social constructs, and 
may mobilize men towards changing these constructs. Second, 
understanding the Gordian knot that is the connection between the 
construction of hegemonic masculinity, domination of the family, and 
economic domination, supports contemplating appropriate reactions to 
the phenomenon that are informed by the way hegemonic masculinity is 
established. This can effect a change in the connection between 
hegemonic masculinity and economic control over the family, which is 
particularly relevant in the context of economic abuse. 
This potential to effect change is also why the perspective of 
masculinities theory cannot be considered separately from insights 
provided through feminist theories.133 Thus, this Part explores “the man 
question” of masculinities theory134—interrogating where and how men 
are situated in relation to the initiation and perpetration of economic 
abuse.135 Specifically, it explores whether and how hegemonic 
masculinity works to provide a basis for economic abuse. However, it asks 
“the man question” in a manner that is not often present in masculinities 
scholarship. For instance, in the context of physical domestic violence, 
masculinities researchers often suggest shifting the lens toward men, 
noting that they too are victims of domestic abuse, and seeing how they 
reproduce as adults the abuse they experienced during their childhood.136 
The path this Part follows is different, even if only because the study of 
economic abuse is in its early stages of recognition and appears to have a 
clear gender dimension. It does not inquire whether there are men who are 
victims of economic abuse at the hands of their female partners (surely 
there may be in certain contexts, although most research points to women 
who suffer from economic abuse), but rather investigates the elements in 
hegemonic masculinity that are related to the phenomenon—to violence 
on one hand, and the family economy on the other. A similar path was 
offered by masculinities researchers, but has not been applied for the most 
 132.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 30; Dowd, Asking the Man Question, supra 
note 131, at 419. 
133.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 56.  
134.  Id. at 66. 
135.  See Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Gender, Masculinities, and Transition in
Conflicted Societies, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2009). 
136.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 73–139.  
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part.137 Understanding economic abuse and using the perspective of 
masculinities theory provides insights for feminist legal theorists to 
contemplate a reaction to economic abuse.138 More broadly, it also sheds 
light on the way power is established and reinforced in the family. 
B. Masculinities and Feminist Theories 
Masculinities theory cannot be considered separately from insights 
provided through feminist theories.139 Such an analysis might stop at 
understanding the social constructions, or worse, justify abusive behaviors 
based on these social constructions. Along with the descriptive 
understanding offered by masculinities theory, feminist theories provide 
critique and the normative goal of advancing gender equality. Therefore, 
masculinities theory should be considered in conjunction with feminist 
theories.140 
Feminist analysis of the phenomenon of economic abuse focuses 
primarily on understanding the phenomenon as an expression of male 
dominance.141 Specifically, dominance feminism emphasizes the 
hierarchy between men and women; the manner by which men dominate 
women, highlighting sexual control; and challenging social institutions, 
such as the law to examine the way in which they reproduce patriarchy.142 
Dominance feminism advocates that the “personal is the political” and 
calls for the politicization of the domestic sphere, and the exposure of 
gender subordination in the family before public, judicial, and political 
forums.143 
 137.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 66. A similar approach was recently 
espoused by Leigh Goodmark. See Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15.  
 138.  For the importance of this approach, see Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, 
Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law: Why They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND 
THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 1, 4 (Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper eds., 
2012) [McGinley & Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law]. 
 139.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 66-67 (noting the importance of masculinities 
theory to men’s self-understandings and to their assuming responsibilities over their privileges).   
 140.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 121 (“Masculinities scholarship can be 
enormously helpful in further exposing the place of violence in masculinity norms and therefore the 
necessity for proactive policies; feminist scholarship can be helpful in pushing masculinities scholars 
to analyse how power is replicated and how it might be undermined.”). 
141.  Branigan, supra note 37, at 7. 
 142.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3 
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. 
143.  CAROL HANISCH, “The Personal is Political,” in RADICAL FEMINISM: A DOCUMENTARY 
READER 113, 113 (Barbara Crow ed., 2000). 
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Some have dichotomized this feminist position from that of 
masculinities theory regarding intimate partner violence.144 According to 
this dichotomy, feminists argue that intimate partner abuse is an assertion 
of power and control by the abuser over his partner. This is in line with 
the long-standing dominance feminist understanding of what causes 
intimate partner abuse145—the quest for domination and abuse as a means 
of asserting power and control.146 By contrast, those employing 
masculinities theory posit that intimate partner abuse may follow a 
narrative of diffused, generalized violence, specifically in a hyper-
masculine context, such as the police or the military.147 This Article points 
to the fact that hegemonic masculinity embeds a notion of controlling 
others in and of itself, while also focusing on the larger, structural reasons 
for exerting that control in an abusive manner towards wives/intimate 
partners and in an economic context. 
C. Masculinities as Performance 
Masculinities theory, an interdisciplinary field that draws from 
sociology, psychology, feminist theories, and queer theories148 argues that 
masculinity is a performance, something that men “do” rather than 
innately “have” or to which they are biologically preordained.149 
Masculinities theory examines the role that males’ gender plays in social 
situations150 and in social institutions.151 Sociologist R.W. Connell, one of 
the field’s pioneers, posited that gender is not an a priori basket of 
characteristics, but rather a collection of experiences which are built 
through social interaction.152 Masculine behaviors and identities manifest 
and establish power relationships that exist within society, not only 
between men and women, but also between men and other men. 
144.  Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 1204-05. 
 145.  Jana L. Jasinski, Theoretical Explanations for Violence Against Women, in SOURCEBOOK 
ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 12 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001). 
146.  See, e.g., V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect
Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 233 (1996). 
147.  Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 1204-05. 
 148.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 18–20; Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v.
DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581 (2010) [hereinafter 
McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis].  
149.  Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 
782 (2000) (noting that other identity factors such as race, class, and sexual orientation give rise to 
multiple masculinities). 
 150.  See Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221 (2015) 
[hereinafter McGinley, Policing].   
151.  McGinley & Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law, supra note 138, at 1.  
152.  R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 71 (2d ed. 2005).  
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Masculinity is “socially constructed through performances. That is, men 
construct their masculine identities through relationships with others”153 
oftentimes by acting differently than women.154 Moreover, masculinity is 
performed and activated in relation to social institutions, like the 
family.155 
A growing body of legal writing is now exploring how masculinities 
theory can shed light on gendered institutions, norms, and practices.156 
Legal scholars, such as Ann McGinley, have argued that masculinities 
theory157 may prove helpful in understanding the motives underlying the 
harmful behaviors of men158 and will eventually lead to increased gender 
equality.159 Nancy Dowd maintains that masculinities theory may prove 
helpful in understanding how male privilege and dominance become 
established.160 
D. Hegemonic Masculinity 
Masculinities theorists contend that most men “attain” their 
masculinity through conforming to the social expectations and codes 
153.  McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 586.  
 154.  JAMES MESSERSCHMIDT, MASCULINITIES AND CRIME: CRITIQUE AND 
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THEORY 182 (1993).  
155.  MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY 113 (2d ed. 2004). 
156.  See, e.g., ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITY AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS 17 (2016); NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 181-212 
(2000); NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 105-122 (1998); Frank 
Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity 
Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 896 (2006) [hereinafter Cooper, Against 
Bipolar Black Masculinity]; Gail Dines, The White Man’s Burden: Gonzo Pornography and the 
Construction of Black Masculinity, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 283 (2006); Fadi Hanna, Punishing 
Masculinity in Gay Asylum Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 913 (2005); Joan W. Howarth, Executing White 
Masculinities: Learning from Karla Faye Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183 (2002); Nancy Levit, 
Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451 (1999). Rachel L. Toker, Multiple Masculinities: A New Vision for Same-
Sex Harassment Law, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577 (1999); Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: 
Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68 (2002); 
see also Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards a New Framework for 
Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431, 433 (2010) (discussing the 
emergence of masculinities theory among law and society scholars). 
 157.  The term is in plural to note the variety of male intersectionality and experience. McGinley 
& Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law, supra note 138, at 6-7.  
 158.  Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 
201, 211-21 (2008); McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 585; Ann C. 
McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex.” 79 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1151 (2008).  
 159.  Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703, 706 
(2011) . 
160.  Dowd, Asking the Man Question, supra note 131, at 416. 
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regarding males and masculinity, and through the performance of 
masculinity pursuant to the social constructs.161 They see a structure, 
framework, ideology, or social norm that demands from men that they 
behave like “real men.”162 Despite the fact that the definition of real men 
is variable, “hegemonic masculinity” describes the male “ideal” as one 
who has the most power at all times and in any given context.163 Although 
there are multiple masculinities, certain aspects of masculinity are so 
dominant and honored by society that they are considered 
“hegemonic.”164 
Hegemonic masculinity is perceived as the ideal or normative 
masculinity.165 Hegemonic masculinity is about power: the power that 
men have and the power that men wield over others.166 Hegemonic 
masculinity’s defining characteristics include aggression, 
competitiveness, and stoicism.167 Hegemonic masculinity is white, 
middle-class, and heterosexual; striving towards hegemonic masculinity 
requires that a man continually prove that he is neither feminine nor 
gay.168 Because most men cannot achieve normative or hegemonic 
 161.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 26; David S. Cohen, Sex Segregation,
Masculinities, and Gender–Variant Individuals, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 167 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012). 
 162.  My use of the terms ideology/norm or ideal/normative in the context of hegemonic 
masculinity is not in the sense that those who use the term hegemonic masculinity consider it an ideal, 
of course, or normatively desirable, but rather that it is descriptive of the type of masculinity that is 
generally most powerful. Some scholars critique this notion even as a description, see, e.g., Jeff Hearn, 
From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men, 5 FEMINIST THEORY 49 (2004). But others 
endorse an approach that “uses the idea of hegemonic (norm-setting) masculinity to explain why 
women and some men are disadvantaged in a given cultural context.” McGinley & Cooper, 
Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law, supra note 138, at 5; see also MESSERSCHMIDT, supra 
note 154, at 79-81; R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegmonic Masculinity: Rethinking 
the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829 (2005); Stephan Whitehead, Hegemonic Masculinity Revisted, 
6 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 58 (1999). Hegemonic masculinity, first coined by CONNELL, supra note 
152, has since acted as an organizing concept in masculinities theory. See, e.g., Jamie R. Abrams, The 
Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing Violence, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (2010) 
(explaining that expanded opportunities for women in the military further entrench hegemonic 
masculinity); Mike Donaldson, What Is Hegemonic Masculinity?, 22 THEORY & SOC’Y 643, 645 
(1993) (explaining hegemonic masculinity as a strategy for women’s subordination).  
163.  CONNELL, supra note 152, at 77−78. 
164.  Id. at 78–81.  
165.  See Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and
Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 686–87 (2009) [hereinafter Cooper, Who’s the 
Man?].  
 166.  Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity, in SEX, GENDER AND SEXUALITY: THE NEW BASICS, AN 
ANTHOLOGY 58, 61 (Abby L. Ferber et al. eds., 2009). 
 167.  David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist Myth of
Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 144 (2009). 
168.  Cooper, Who’s the Man?, supra note 165, at 689–90; McGinley, A Masculinities Theory
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masculinity, although they continuously strive for it, many men engage in 
behaviors intended to prove that they are, in fact, masculine.169 
Despite the increased emphasis in masculinities theory being placed 
on the relationship between men and other men, for example, between 
black and white men or between men of different social classes,170 it is 
important to consider that hegemonic masculinity is internalized, and its 
performance is executed in contexts where it may not necessarily be 
manifested only vis-à-vis other men. Hegemonic masculinity does not 
only exert its influence in all-male interactions, but also on the self-
conception that men have of themselves. Therefore, the performance of 
masculinity is not a feature exclusive to cases where one is performing in 
front of other men. At times, it could be directed towards women in the 
privacy of one’s home, and may be used for the purpose of aggrandizing 
one’s self-conception of one’s own masculinity. 
In most western societies, hegemonic masculinity focuses on 
competition, aggression, control, subjugating the other, family patriarchy, 
and readiness to commit violence.171 Repudiation, dominance over, and 
mistreatment of women are powerful methods of asserting masculinity.172 
For the most part, hegemonic masculinity is focused on being the family’s 
provider or breadwinner.173 Researchers claim that this practice helps men 
preserve their power over women.174 Western society identifies the ability 
to be the economic provider of the family as masculine, and often money 
constitutes a “yardstick” for one’s masculinity.175 Scholars note that the 
ability to earn money, to control it, and to use it to provide for the family 
proves to many men their own masculinity and accordingly, strengthens 
their sense of self-worth.176 
Analysis, supra note 148, at 586. 
169.  McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 586. 
170.  Id.  
171.  JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, NINE LIVES: ADOLESCENT MASCULINITIES, THE BODY, AND 
VIOLENCE 10 (2000); MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDER OF DESIRE: ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY 
30 (2005).  
172.  Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 156, at 896.  
 173.  Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 43. See also RICHARD COLLIER, MASCULINITY, LAW AND
THE FAMILY 195 (1995), and infra notes 186-208.  
174.  Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 364 (2004). 
175. AMALIA ROSENBLUM & ZVI TRIGER, SPEECHLESS 90−92 (2007); Ann C. McGinley, 
Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 795, 802 (2013) [hereinafter McGinley, 
Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power]. 
 176.  Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine 
Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253 (2013); McGinley, A 
Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 614; McGinley, Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual 
Power, supra note 175. 
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E. The Relationship Between Hegemonic Masculinity, Violence, and 
Coercive Control 
Scholars note that violence as an element of masculinity is 
profoundly tied to the assertion of social stature and ingrained in the 
edifice of the masculine self.177 Others have noticed that given the 
association of violence and criminality with hegemonic masculinity, men 
may deploy violence and crime to separate themselves from women, 
thereby constituting their masculinity.178 Men are not essentially violent, 
of course, and “[c]rime by men is not simply an extension of the ‘male 
sex role.’ Rather, crime by men is a form of social practice invoked as a 
resource, when other resources are unavailable, for accomplishing 
masculinity.”179 Acting violently is therefore “one socially recognized 
way of being a man.”180 
Various researchers contend that crime and violence are ways of 
performing hegemonic masculinity.181 Humiliation, shaming, and 
competition between men are also important components in establishing 
hegemonic masculinity. The subjugation of women is an additional way 
of establishing male identity.182 Thus, performance of hegemonic 
masculinity sometimes includes the harassment, contempt, shaming, and 
subjugation of the other.183 Scholars claim that some men are occupied in 
the performance of their masculinity by aggression in order to 
differentiate themselves from their wives and thereby strengthen their 
sense of masculinity.184 As Naomi Cahn observed, power within the 
household remains an assertion of identity.185 
F. The Relationship between Hegemonic Masculinity, Breadwinning, 
and the Home 
Men are commonly socialized into male roles as traditional heads of 
households or breadwinners.186 Scholars agree that breadwinning shapes 
177.  Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 6. 
178.  MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 84–85.  
179.  Id. at 85. 
180.  Harris, supra note 149, at 782. 
181.  MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 83-85.  
182.  McGinley, Policing, supra note 150, at 245 (“[M]ale police officers denigrate female 
officers as well as women in the community as a means of enhancing their own masculinity.”); 
Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15. 
183.  McGinley, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, supra note 148, at 601−03.  
184.  McGinley, Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power, supra note 175, at 801−02. 
185.  Cahn, supra note 53, at 202. 
186.  Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 118. 
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most men’s sense of self, gender, and manhood,187 and note that a 
“providership requirement represents hegemonic masculinity in its purest 
form.”188 A key element of hegemonic masculinity is wage earning.189 
While men’s roles cannot be essentialized, and there are important 
variations within different racial, ethnic, and socio-economic 
communities,190 with regard to how men understand and perform 
masculinity, hegemonic masculinity posits male breadwinning as an 
enduring staple of manhood. To perform hegemonic masculinity, men 
must establish their status as breadwinners, whether through proving their 
physical strength in blue collar jobs, or their heroic stamina by working 
long hours in professional settings.191 McGinley notes that today work is 
a site in which men earn their identities; work is competitive, and through 
work, men prove their masculinity by aggregating power: be it by 
accumulating wealth for professionals, making good salaries by middle-
class men, or performing tough physical labor by men of the working-
class.192 
Whereas money had been coded in patriarchal culture as 
“masculine,”193 some claim that patriarchy created a dangerous liaison 
between women and money.194 According to this claim, femininity is 
characterized by patriarchal culture as passive and dependent, and women 
are characterized as lacking knowledge and skills in every aspect 
pertaining to money and finances.195 Culture is saturated, according to this 
view, with images that express women’s apparent lack of skill in 
everything finance-related, but shows their desire for money and their 
lightheadedness when using it.196 
Under masculinities theory, one of the strongest commands which 
hegemonic masculinity makes is that one may not, at any price, act as a 
187.  ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 2 (1993). 
 188.  Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 279; Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind: 
How the Family and Medical Leave Act Perpetuates Sex Inequality Across All Class Levels, 16 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 429, 442−43 (2007).  
189.  Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, Dirty Harry Meets Dirty Diapers: Masculinities, At-home 
Fathers, and Making the Law Work for Families, 22 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 21 (2012). 
 190.  Id. at 21−23 (noting that even stay-at-home dads aim to preserve their masculinity by 
maintaining breadwinner status through engaging in limited, paid work allowing them to meet the 
breadwinning requirement “at least in spirit”). 
 191.  JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 86 (2010); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 274−75. 
192.  See MCGINLEY, supra note 156, at 6-7, 15-16.  
193.  Zvi Triger, Money, Contracts and Gender, 18 L. & BUS. 135, 136 (2014). 
194.  Id. at 142, 150.  
195.  Id. at 139−40. 
196.  Id. 
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woman.197 It is not surprising, therefore, that as women establish their 
socio-economic status in the market, this may create a fear among men as 
to their own manhood.198 When women obtain jobs and positions 
historically held by men, this may threaten some men’s sense of masculine 
identity, and some may react to this threat by engaging in harassing 
behaviors in the workplace.199 Thus, one may, similarly, interpret 
incidents of economic abuse, in which men restrict their wives’ 
employment as fear of “losing” their own masculinity. 
Men face significant pressures in the workplace to abide by the 
breadwinning code,200 and scholars have recognized the fact that the 
working norms in the most sought-after industries are “masculine.”201 
This is not to suggest that all men have power in the market, but rather 
that the market has traditionally been gendered male. Hegemonic 
masculinity is intrinsically tied with men’s roles as providers so much so 
that scholars note that “no social construct bears more power over men 
than the expectation that they serve as the family breadwinner,”202 as the 
person who “brings home the bacon.” As a result, women’s increased 
economic roles as providers are “shaking men’s identities to their 
foundations.”203 Furthermore, in today’s volatile economy of long work 
hours and weak social safety nets,204 fewer American men are able to 
satisfy the providership expectation.205 
By contrast, caregiving is usually not “masculine.”206 Most men are 
still reluctant to fully take on care-work, which remains a highly 
feminized form of work.207 Household labor symbolizes women’s gender 
197.  Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 29. 
 198.  Triger, supra note at 193, at 149−50; Richard H. Thaler, Breadwinning Wives and Nervous 
Husbands, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/business/breadwinner-
wives-and-nervous-husbands.html [http://perma.cc/2R8E-9B2F]. 
199.  See MCGINLEY, supra note 156, at 17 & Introduction (explaining that men are pressured 
to serve as breadwinners and harassing/violent behavior is a way to claim masculinity). 
200.  Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 258. 
 201.  Richard Collier, Rethinking Men and Masculinities in the Contemporary Legal Profession: 
The Example of Fatherhood, Transnational Business Masculinities, and Work Life Balance in Large 
Law Firms, 13 NEV. L.J. 410, 414 (2013). 
202.  KATHLEEN GERSON, NO MAN’S LAND: MEN’S CHANGING COMMITMENTS TO FAMILY AND
WORK 259 (1993) (“If men no longer share a distinctive identity based on their economic role as 
family providers, then what is a man?”). 
203.  MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY 288 (3d ed. 2012). 
 204.  See Crain, supra note 74, at 1918–19 (arguing that post-industrialism has made the family 
wage unattainable for most families); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 280.  
205.  See Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 523–24 (1996) 
(discussing men’s work patterns). 
206.  NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 31−33 (2000). 
207.  Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 176, at 254. 
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role conformance, while breadwinning symbolizes men’s gender 
conformance. Men are often reluctant to engage in the feminine 
occupation of family-work, fearing their status as real men will 
diminish.208 
G. Economic Abuse as a Misguided Interpretation of Hegemonic 
Masculinity 
Masculinities theory claims that there is constant pressure on men as 
individuals to aspire toward the ideal of hegemonic masculinity.209 
Despite the fact that men try to conform to the social ideal of hegemonic 
masculinity, it is an ideal that many feel is unobtainable.210 In an era where 
workers must work longer hours with fewer safety nets, the race to attain 
hegemonic masculinity is very difficult indeed. 
As a result, some men are likely to develop interpretations or 
objections to hegemonic masculinity.211 At times it is precisely the 
performance of the interpretation of hegemonic masculinity which is 
especially belligerent.212 A significant insight from masculinities theory 
is that men, as a group, enjoy the “patriarchal dividends” from the power 
and resources of being men; however, because of the pressures exerted on 
men to act pursuant to masculine norms, as individuals, they often feel 
powerless.213 It is precisely this feeling of powerlessness which creates 
the need to control others.214 This may be more pronounced in times of 
economic hardship. The imperative to differentiate from women promotes 
some men’s greater assertion of control over the family economy. 
Against this backdrop it is possible to think of economic abuse as an 
interpretation of hegemonic masculinity. As noted, according to 
masculinities theorists, violence is a type of resource that men exercise 
when they do not possess other resources in order to perform 
masculinity.215 Wielding economic abuse is therefore a way for certain 
men to perform masculinity and hold on to their power over their family 
208.  Cahn, supra note 53, at 200–01. 
209.  CONNELL, supra note 152, at 121–24; Kimmel, supra note 166, at 61-62. 
210.  BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOLS 106 (1993); Dowd, Asking 
the Man Question, supra note 131, at 421. (“[M]asculinity requires constant proof of one’s manhood: 
it is a status never achieved but one constantly to be established and tested.”). 
211.  THORNE, supra note 210, at 106. 
 212.  See MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 11–12; McGinley, A Masculinities Theory 
Analysis, supra note 148. 
213.  CONNELL, supra note 152, at 79, 229–30; DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 
30–31; Kimmel, supra note 166, at 68. 
214.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 31.  
215.  Id. at 33; MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 154, at 85. 
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through economic resources. Economic abuse over one’s wife and 
coercive control with respect to the family’s resources may thus represent 
a performance of hegemonic masculinity. 
Nonetheless, masculinities theory also shows that men pay a price 
for their superfluous rights in society.216 Men pay a price in their parenting 
and a price for their very control. Controlling the family economy, while 
granting power, also imposes burdens (for men in the lower social-strata 
to obtain money, and for men in higher echelons to preserve and cultivate 
capital). Additionally, the very control of the other induces tension, guilt, 
and fear. Importantly, researchers emphasize that despite the fact that men 
are molded by social constructs, they are also, as a category and as 
individuals and at certain time periods, agents of social practices.217 
Potentially, at least, they are likely also to deviate from the script dictated 
by hegemonic masculinity. 
Masculinities theory explains the centrality of economic control, 
breadwinning, coercive control, and even violence to the construction of 
hegemonic masculinity and, therefore, can shed light on the myriad social 
factors that enable economic abuse. Insights from masculinities theory on 
the ways by which male identity is established, on the importance of 
economic control as part of hegemonic masculinity, and on the use of 
violence as a resource for establishing masculinity may explain the 
existence of economic abuse as a socio-legal phenomenon.218 Masculinity 
theory points to the ways by which men attain and preserve power, but 
also the prices they pay for their control. While economic control may be 
an element of hegemonic masculinity that may be used coercively and that 
may be difficult for some men to relinquish on their own, it is also socially 
constructed and historically contingent. It is therefore changeable. There 
is nothing natural or inevitable about this notion of masculinity as 
aggressive, controlling, and economically domineering. Today 
hegemonic masculinity, backed by social, historical, legal, and economic 
gender inequities provides a foundation for economic abuse to occur. 
Clearly a change of hegemonic masculinity, which is now based on 
providership, control, and violence requires a separation from privileges 
from which men derive benefit219 and an untangling of the relationship 
between masculinity, control, and money. 
216.  DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 7, at 59. 
217.  Hearn, supra note 162. 
218.  See McGinley, Masculinity, Labor, and Sexual Power, supra note 175, at 800.  
219.  Dowd et al., supra note 7, at 30. 
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss2/3
2017] POWER IN THE AGE OF IN/EQUALITY 355 
V. BETWEEN REMEDIES AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES 
Economic abuse is a complex problem, with myriad manifestations, 
and no easy solutions. This Part presents and provides justification for 
some remedies, while critiquing others, based on the insights provided 
earlier. More broadly, it contemplates some fundamental changes that are 
required to mitigate economic abuse. 
Currently, the legal system’s general tendency to focus on physical 
harm presents significant challenges to women who are economically 
abused.220 Economic abuse is rarely recognized as domestic violence by 
state criminal and civil laws because of the focus on physical assaults,221 
and seldom falls neatly into the enumerated categories of abuse that 
provide legal protection.222 A recent report conducted at Cornell 
University found a dearth of effective systems in place to remedy the 
impacts of economic abuse.223 A critique of domestic violence policies 
has been that they focus on physical and sexual violence as paradigmatic 
of intimate partner abuse, while neglecting other harms such as economic 
abuse.224 The policies’ goal is immediate crisis control rather than 
promotion of long term security.225 The policies favor separation, often 
neglecting the desires of the abused partner and the web of relationships 
that de facto keep partners in contact.226 
Scholars note the centrality of the criminal justice system is focused 
on physical harms in U.S. domestic violence law and policy.227 At present, 
220.  Conner, supra note 8, at 363; Pollet, supra note 11, at 41. 
221.  GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 38-42; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1112. 
222.  Conner, supra note 8, at 362.   
223.  Stringer, supra note 22.  
224.  Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1112. 
225.  Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 157. 
226.  Id. 
227.  Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 1195. This centrality must also be 
understood against the background of the state’s initial absence of a response to domestic violence 
and the feminist focus on reacting to this void. The many services developed, such as protective 
orders, emergency shelters, and counselling were accomplished due to these efforts. See Johnson, 
Changing Course, supra note 8, at 155–57. Goodmark explains the historical developments: In 1984, 
the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence framed domestic violence as a criminal justice 
issue and strongly recommended expanding the criminal justice response to domestic violence. 
Although the first developments in domestic violence law were civil, in the form of protection orders, 
changes to the criminal law soon followed, with states passing laws creating substantive crimes of 
domestic violence. Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 102. See JEFFREY FAGAN, THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 4–5, 8–9 (1996); Leigh 
Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 75, 92–96 (2008); Goodmark, Hands Up at Home, supra note 15, at 140–45; Cheryl 
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857–60 (1996); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle 
for the Future of Domestic Violence Law Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1668–75 (2004); Deborah 
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every state has criminal laws that enable it to intervene on behalf of 
women, primarily in the case of physical abuse.228 The criminal justice 
system is an important means of addressing intimate partner abuse.229 
Specifically, some have suggested criminalizing domestic oppression, 
dynamics, and patterns of coercive control, which would encompass 
economic abuse.230 
In recent years, however, scholars have critiqued both the fit and the 
desirability of the criminal justice response to ameliorate intimate partner 
abuse. Some have challenged its effectiveness,231 while others have 
challenged its disproportionate impact on the poor and on people of 
color.232 Others have claimed that the focus on criminality ignores the 
larger structural issues that drive intimate partner abuse, such as economic 
insecurity.233 While some scholars note that the criminal system merely 
substitutes the abusers’ authority over the abused with that of the 
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic 
Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 970–71 (2004). Following the cancellation of the civil 
rights remedy in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994, Violence Against Women Act 
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981) 
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-62), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
VAWA funds most of the programs concerning domestic violence, with the largest federal 
appropriations granted to the criminal justice system. See Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, 
at 161. For more on the VAWA, see Julie Goldscheid, Advancing Equality in Domestic Violence Law 
Reform, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 417, 418–21 (2003); Julie Goldscheid, Elusive 
Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 736 (2007); Julie 
Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not 
Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165–71 (2005); Rashida Manjoo, The Continuum of Violence against 
Women and the Challenges of Effective Redress, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2012). For the 
influence of the Act, see Weissman, supra note 17, at 227. 
228.  GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 1.  
 229.  Id. at 22; Leigh Goodmark, Stalled at 20: VAWA, the Criminal Justice System, and the
Possibilities of Restorative Justice (U. Md. Francis King Carey Sch. Law, Research Paper No. 2015-
3, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2575646 [http://perma.cc/39FP-
EG24]. 
230.  Steve Mulligan, Redefining Domestic Violence: Using the Power and Control Paradigm
for Domestic Violence Legislation, 29 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 33, 39 (2009); Alafair S. Burke, 
Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 552, 556 (2007) (arguing for criminalization when the abuser is engaged in a pattern 
of domestic violence with the intent to gain power or control over the victim); Tuerkheimer, supra 
note 227, at 970–71. Internationally, some jurisdictions have chosen to address economic abuse as a 
criminal offense. See, e.g., Pami Vyas, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in India: Economic 
Abuse and the Need for Broad Statutory Interpretation to Promote Women’s Fundamental Rights, 13 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 177, 179 (2006); Mary Johnson Osirim, Crisis in the State and the Family: 
Violence Against Women in Zimbabwe, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 153 (2003). 
231.  GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 199. 
 232.  BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S PRISON 
NATION 3, 99-124 (2012); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material 
Resources and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (2000).  
233.  Weissman, supra note 17, at 238. 
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state’s,234 robbing women of their autonomy and ignoring their needs.235 
Importantly, some have noted that criminalization reinforces masculinity 
as aggressive.236 Others have suggested using tort law to sue partners for 
monetary damages in cases of economic abuse.237 Although that may 
enhance women’s agency and grant them economic redress, such suits 
would only be effective insofar as the abusive partner has assets or 
finances from which to collect.238 
Today, civil protection orders (CPOs) are the most common and 
widely used relief for domestic violence.239 CPOs are generally 
considered as empowering for abused partners who seek judicial 
protection, while simultaneously providing a legal mechanism to enforce 
their  decision to act.240 Scholars have critiqued the limited recognition of 
selected harms for which CPOs are used and have suggested the need to 
incorporate a broader approach that will encompass economic abuse.241 
While every state has enacted CPO statutes, the states offer different 
definitions of what constitutes domestic violence (all refer to an actual or 
threatened criminal offense against an intimate partner or family 
member),242 and most do not incorporate a definition that includes 
 234.  SUK, supra note 63, at 7, 53-54; id. at 54 (“[There is] an opportunity for critical reflection 
on the increasing subordination of individual autonomy in domestic space to state control of the home 
in the name of the public interest.”).  
 235.  Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009). Goodmark also observed 
that money funneled into the criminal justice system is not spent on housing, job training, or economic 
development. See GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 22. 
 236.  Jamie R. Abrams, Migrating and Mutating Masculinities in Institutional Law Reform, in 
EXPLORING MASCULINITIES: FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY REFLECTIONS 145, 146–47, 153 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Michael Thomson eds., 2013) [hereinafter Abrams, Migrating and Mutating 
Masculinities]. 
237.  Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1158. 
238.  Littwin, supra note 3, at 957. 
239.  Stoever, supra note 117, at 1021. For the historical evolution of CPOs, see id. at 1035–44. 
240.  Adeola Olagunji & Christine Reynolds, Domestic Violence, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 203, 
207 (2012). But see Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: 
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 
(2008) (explaining that domestic violence law does not sufficiently meet the needs of women who 
want the relationship to continue but the violence to stop, but by customizing each order to express 
the victim’s preferences for how much and what kinds of contact should be allowed, these orders can 
put the force of law behind the individual woman’s choices); Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 
5, at 1128; Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, 
in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 64 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (noting that agency means not living with oppression, but that the “all-agent or 
all-victim conceptual dichotomy will not be easy to escape or transform”). 
 241.  Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1115 (listing the jurisdictions that can 
potentially address coercion or economic abuse). See also Conner, supra note 8. 
242.  Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality 
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economic abuse.243 While several states recognize certain elements of 
coercive control as abuse,244 few have directly addressed economic 
of Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 35 (2008); Kristy Candela, Protecting the Invisible Victim: 
Incorporating Coercive Control in Domestic Violence Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112 (2016); 
Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 159; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1131–
32.  
243.  Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1130–38. 
 244.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:l (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (includes “interference 
with freedom” under definition of abuse); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (Westlaw through 
2017 Sess.) (definition of abuse includes “engaging in a course of alarming or distressing conduct in 
a manner which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress”), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(13) 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (Michigan defines abuse as “any other specific act or conduct that 
imposes on or interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence”); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (Maine defines abuse as 
“[c]ompelling a person by force, threat of force or intimidation to engage in conduct from which the 
person has a right or privilege to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right to engage”). 
But “not one state has encompassed the entirety of coercive control as abuse in their domestic violence 
statute.” Candela, supra note 242, at 113. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); 
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 6300-6301 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-101 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-15 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); D.C. CODE § 16-1003 (Westlaw through 
2017 Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (Westlaw through Act 3 of 2017 Sess.); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 39-6304 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 60/103 (Westlaw through 
Public Acts eff. Nov. 22, 2017); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); IOWA CODE 
§ 236.2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I 9-A, § 4002 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MD. 
CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 4-504 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 
(Westlaw through Ch. 74 of 2017 Sess.); MICH. COMP LAWS § 600.2950 (Westlaw through 2017 
Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-7 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (Westlaw through 
2017 Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (amended by 2017 Nev. Laws 
Ch. 496 (S.B. 361)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B.1 (Westlaw through Ch. 258 of 2017 Sess.); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 40-13-3 (Westlaw through 
2017 Sess.); N.Y. FAM. LAW § 842 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 50B-1 (Westlaw through 2017-142 with the exception of 2017-6, §§ 1-4(c)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-07.1-02 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Westlaw through 2017 
Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.4 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Sess.) (excluding Ch. 750); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 6102 (Westlaw through 
2017 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-
10-3 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.004 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Sess.); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-501 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 
(Westlaw through 2017 Act 58); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-103 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.). 
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abuse.245 Furthermore, different states offer different remedies: some 
jurisdictions may prohibit contact (stay-away orders), abuse, and 
harassment; other jurisdictions may require an abusive partner to vacate a 
shared residence; some jurisdictions may order counseling for domestic 
violence, substance abuse, or parenting skills, award use of jointly-owned 
possessions, or order child support, housing payments, and medical 
expenses resulting from the abuse.246 While two-thirds of the states 
provide catch-all provision that could deliver economic orders beyond 
child support and could include damages,247 state courts rarely order 
economic relief,248 despite the importance of issuing significant economic 
remedies as part of CPOs.249 
Littwin suggests a mechanism to repair credit scores as a way to 
redress the ramifications of credit ruined by coerced debt—the blocking 
of credit debt from credit reporting agencies and vesting family courts 
with the decision of the parties’ responsibilities to the debt.250 Others have 
suggested creating incentives for financial institutions to be mindful of 
coerced debt and better monitor and report it.251 Parenting education is 
commonly used by courts, and in some states it is even mandated.252 
 245.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-101 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (Colorado’s 
statute describes abuse as “financial control, document control, and other types of control that make 
a victim more likely to return to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs”); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(1)(g), (4) (Westlaw through 2017 Sess. No. 150) (Michigan’s statute 
permits a court to issue an order if a partner is interfering with employment or education). 
 246.  Stoever, supra note 117, at 1043. Importantly, many apply to unmarried and same-sex 
partners. Id. 
 247.  Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 159. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §16-1005(c) 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.). 
 248.  Weissman, supra note 17, at 228; Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic 
Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 3, 43 (1999). 
 249.  Erika A. Sussman, The Civil Protection Orders as a Tool for Economic Justice, J.W. MAG. 
(2006), https://csaj.org/document-library/POasEconJustice2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/28BJ-N7LE].  
 250.  Littwin acknowledges that her proposal applies only to women who are divorcing their 
abusers, and that it cannot assist those who wish to stay or are unmarried. Littwin, Escaping Battered 
Credit, supra note 8, at 365-66, 390–408.  
 251.  Christine Kim, Credit Cards: Weapons for Domestic Violence, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 281, 307 (2015). 
 252.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-351 to 25-353 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-12-322 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.7 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-69b (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 1507(h) (Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017 Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.21 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/404.1 (Westlaw through Public Acts eff. Nov. 22, 
2017); IOWA CODE § 598.15 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3214 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:306 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. 
LAW § 7-103.2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.157 (Westlaw through 2017 
Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.600 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-226 
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Similarly, financial literacy education has been offered as possible 
redress.253 Yet such financial education should stress the importance of 
consensual and equitable management of resources, and should also be 
critical of financial institutions’ goals and means, to be instrumental in 
preventing or mitigating cases of economic abuse.254 Such financial 
education, if properly provided to women, could potentially assist in 
untangling the Gordian knot between hegemonic masculinity and money 
control. Yet, some of these measures are only applicable to women who 
would want to separate from the abusive partner, which is not always the 
case.255 
Some have suggested amending CPO laws to include economic 
abuse, to allow an economically abused woman to restructure how she 
interacts with her partner and how to maintain property,256 hoping such 
orders will change power dynamics that are at the core of abuse. Yet their 
short term duration does not correspond to persistent long term dangers,257 
and specifically to the long term effects of economic abuse. By 
themselves, CPOs are emergency measures, isolated from the broader 
social picture that enables economic abuse. The following is a telling 
example of the law’s limited effect, even when CPOs are constructed to 
redress economic abuse. In a recent New Jersey case, an estranged spouse 
was purposefully interfering with his former spouses’ employment.258 The 
court recognized this behavior as economic abuse and a form of coercion 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2928 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 43:458-D (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-12.3, 12.5 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 107.2 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 3.425 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.) (excluding Ch. 750); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-408 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.009 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.3 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-104 (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.); WIS. 
STAT. § 767.401 (Westlaw through 2017 Act 58); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(f) (Westlaw through 
2017 Sess.). Programs authorizing judges to “order” divorcing parents to participate in parental 
education classes are already mandated by court rules in at least Alaska, California, Georgia, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming. See Tali 
Schaefer, Saving Children or Blaming Parents? Lessons from Mandated Parenting Classes, 19 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 491, 495 (2010); Susan L. Pollet & Melissa Lombreglia, A Nationwide 
Survey of Mandatory Parent Education, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 375 (2008). 
253.  Kim, supra note 251.  
 254.  Because under extreme coercion or violence, consent may not be genuine, these programs 
should likewise stress an equitable component of money managing.  
255.  Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
256.  Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1129. 
257.  Stoever, supra note 117, at 1021. 
258.  C.G. v. E.G., No. FV-1921-16, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1638 (Ch. Div. June 30, 
2016). 
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under the newly amended New Jersey domestic violence law.259 The court 
granted a restraining order to protect the woman’s rights to “be left 
alone.”260 While the restraining order was helpful in the immediate 
situation, that alone does not undermine the phenomenon of economic 
abuse or the imbalance of power within the family that breeds coercive 
control, more generally. 
Scholars have critiqued the short term nature of domestic violence 
policy and have proposed to shift law, policy, and funding towards long 
term goals of supporting women’s economic security.261 These scholars 
suggest enhancing economic security through myriad measures, such as 
housing, career counseling, long term physical and mental health care, 
economic remedies, secure employment, and enhancing social capital, 
reliable public benefits, associations, and networks of support.262 These 
changes could be helpful in certain contexts, if provided in a non-
demeaning, empowering, and sufficient way. Financial resilience could 
recalibrate power within an intimate relationship263 because studies 
suggest that, except for women in high income brackets, increasing 
women’s income (and men’s incomes) tends to reduce domestic 
violence.264 Law and society bears responsibility for ameliorating 
economic abuse because they have enforced a long history of engendered 
power in the family, and have been complacent in structuring the 
background for the perpetration of economic abuse, through the 
enablement of “ideal worker” norms in the market and a “laissez-faire” 
attitude towards managing money in the marriage. State responsibility is 
 259.  In August, 2015, the New Jersey Legislature formally amended the Domestic Violence Act 
to include certain additional definitions of domestic violence, including coercion under N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(15) (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.), as defined by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5 
(Westlaw through 2017 Sess.). 
260.  C.G., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1638. 
261.  Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 153. See also GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 
157. 
262.  Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 153. See also GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 
157. 
263.  Conner, supra note 8, at 374; see also Coker, supra note 232, at 1022–23. 
 264.  Johnson, Changing Course, supra note 8, at 180–81; Kameri Christy-McMullin, Designing 
Policies that Address the Relationship Between Woman Abuse and Economic Resources, 29 J. SOC. 
& SOC. WELFARE 109, 113 (2002); Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, An Economic Analysis of 
Domestic Violence, 55 REV. SOC. ECON. 337 (1997). Margo Lindauer, “Please Stop Telling Her to 
Leave”: Where Is The Money: Reclaiming Economic Power to Address Domestic Violence, 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1263 (2016) (“[E]conomic dependence is a critical factor in violence 
prevention.”). But see Kameri Christy-McMullin, An Evidenced-Based Approach to a Theoretical 
Understanding of the Relationship Between Economic Resources, Race/Ethnicity, and Woman Abuse, 
3 J. EVIDENCE-BASED SOC. WORK 1, 23 (2006) (showing studies examining the relationship between 
economic resources and abuse provided mixed results). 
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thus justified because law and society have designed the gender 
constructions that enable the power dynamics that lead to economic abuse. 
Furthermore, because of law and society’s place in the construction 
of intimate power, we need to contemplate modes of relief that go beyond 
the immediate, individual abused woman, the abusive partner, and even 
beyond her economic security, and generate larger structural changes in 
intimate power distribution that will destabilize and transcend current 
notions of hegemonic masculinity. We need to think about the social and 
legal structures relating to the market and the family that are in place and 
which now provide a fertile ground for economic abuse to take place and 
which affect everyone: men, women, children, those currently facing 
economic abuse, and those who may experience it at some point. I suggest 
that we should contemplate remedies that carry out the following goals: 
(1) destabilize hegemonic masculinity and (2) promote women’s 
“agency”265—which has been proved crucial in overcoming violence266—
by increasing resilience through increasing women’s economic assets and 
social relationships.267 
The historical lens combined with insights from masculinities theory 
tell us how structural power dynamics continue to shape families’ lives, 
even in the age of formal equality.  When we think of the ties between 
economic abuse and hegemonic masculinity, socialization towards 
violence, the historical socialization of men as heads of households, and 
the impact of economic volatility, it becomes clear that a systemic, 
structural paradigm must enrich the individualistic mode of thought that 
currently inhibits domestic violence redress. Seen this way, economic 
abuse is performed by individuals onto individuals, but it is inflicted 
 265.  I extend to this context Kathryn Abrams’ conceptualization of agency as self-direction 
rather than autonomy and as embedded in systemic inequality. Under this understanding, agency can 
be cultivated through material, structural, political, and cultural supports. See Abrams, From 
Autonomy to Agency, supra note 101, at 831-32, 834, 841, 845 (1999) (“[A]s women’s self-
direction . . . has come to be understood as a multiple socially-influenced phenomenon that takes 
place in a context of shifting and unequal power relations, some theorists have begun to argue that 
legal regulation in this area may help to foster agency . . . human beings are formed in their 
preferences, abilities, and capacities to respond to coercion, by material circumstances, and 
relationships or affiliations with others.”).  
 266.  See Kathryn Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 112-14 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2004); Goldfarb, supra note 240, at 1501–02, 1523; Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1114. 
 267.  Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 15 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality]. While 
Fineman’s theory objects to identity-based categories as a basis of vulnerability, and this Article has 
used masculinities theory to observe how power is distributed in the family, it has embedded its 
identity analysis in social structures and therefore, I believe, is able to rely on her conceptualization 
of “resilience” as meant to provide resources for countering vulnerabilities, such as violence.  
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against a backdrop of historical, social, and economic structures that the 
state through law has put in place. Therefore, it would be a mistake to 
think about economic abuse only in an individualized manner, but rather, 
we ought to think about economic abuse in a way that is related to the 
structures of the family and the market. Ameliorating economic abuse 
may require no less than undoing hegemonic masculinity. A temporary 
CPO may provide concrete relief for an abused woman if it applies to 
economic abuse; if it provides resources for economic and emotional 
healing; if it is provided for a long enough period of time; and if there are 
good jobs with decent wages in place, as well as transportation options 
and proper child-care (many, many “ifs”). However, it will not put an end 
to the cycle of violence on a societal level. Undoing hegemonic 
masculinity will not be achieved through a temporary stay away order nor 
a mandatory arrest. Although these may be helpful in the case of a 
concrete and immediate emergency, mandatory arrests and using the 
criminal system may also exacerbate the problem by reinforcing the 
connections between masculinity and crime, especially for people of color 
and the poor.268 Destabilizing hegemonic masculinity therefore requires a 
deeper reaching approach. It requires creating positive non-violent role 
models and means for men to achieve status that are not only economic 
and not primarily economic.269 At a societal level, it may require 
advancing new, alternative notions of manhood. It requires relinquishing 
economic dominance as a staple of manhood, on the one hand, and an 
expansion of men’s other productive roles in the family, on the other. 
Concurrently, we should think of fostering women’s agency by using 
law to combat women’s oppression,270 and substantially equalizing 
opportunities for women. Women’s increased market participation may 
decrease their economic dependence271 if such participation also accounts 
for the caregiving responsibilities women often have, and if such 
participation provides reasonable resources, decent work, and benefits. 
Supporting hierarchy-attenuating policies such as government sponsored 
268.  Abrams, Migrating and Mutating Masculinities, supra note 236. 
 269.  This may require education and training. There are organizations worldwide that aim to 
challenge the norms of hegemonic masculinity and encourage men to take larger caretaking roles in 
their families, see, e.g., About, PROMUNDO GLOBAL, http://promundoglobal.org/about/ 
[http://perma.cc/3T5B-G9C3]. For a similar approach regarding transition to peace in conflicted 
societies, see Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 20.  
270.  Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency, supra note 101. 
271.  Jennifer Swanberg et al., Working Women Making It Work: Intimate Partner Violence, 
Employment, and Workplace Support, 22 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 292 (2007); Ross Macmillan & 
Rosemary Gartner, When She Brings Home the Bacon: Labor-Force Participation and the Risk of 
Spousal Violence Against Women, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 947 (1999); Jamie Haar, Women’s Work: 
Economic Security in the Domestic Violence Context, 31 HOFSTRA. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 471 (2014). 
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child-care and the de-marginalization of care work (often associated with 
women) is needed to provide for a society in which both men and women 
work, care, and share power; and where families are well-supported.272 
Domestic violence is characterized by a power imbalance between 
the parties.273 Household power differentials replicate market hierarchies, 
and family well-being must be considered within the realm of the market 
and the political economy.274 We may need to reconsider law’s “laissez-
faire” attitude towards managing money during marriage, especially given 
the connections between hegemonic masculinity and economic control, 
and since the family is our first and possibly most important school of 
justice.275 We may need to strengthen demands to overhaul work norms 
that discriminate against caregivers and perpetuate their economic 
inequality,276 and insist on norms that allow for familial caregiving 
alongside good work.277 
Power imbalances are deeply ingrained in society. Changes in social 
policy regarding child-care, changes in work norms, and a reevaluation of 
the law’s attitude towards money management during marriage may 
change some of the power imbalance, destabilize hegemonic masculinity, 
and provide more resources for women to recalibrate familial power 
dynamics. Addressing violent masculinity through meaningful economic 
opportunities,278 while also opening up new avenues for performing 
masculinity not solely focused on breadwinning, may positively affect not 
 272.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 2, at 209. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE 
STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 9 (2010) (arguing for state 
responsibility to support caretaking); Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 267; Martha 
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010). 
273.  GOODMARK, supra note 6, at 123. 
 274.  EICHNER, supra note 272, at 55–57; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY 
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 88-89 (2004) (market affects familial well-being); June Carbone, 
Unpacking Inequality and Class: Family, Gender and the Reconstruction of Class Barriers, 45 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 527, 530 (2011). 
275.  SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 21 (1983). Czapanskiy, supra 
note 77, at 1461 (“Fomenting change is an old and a legitimate role for law in the realm of family 
conduct as well as in the realm of other gendered relationships.”); id. at 1481 (“The potential of the 
law to express a social norm as well as to make a difference in people’s conduct is substantial.”); 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1926 
(2000) (“[L]egal rules can clarify and announce the specific behavioral expectations embodied in 
social norms.”); Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male Circumcision to Understand Social Norms as 
Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 455 (2003) (arguing that the law can be used to change norms for 
circumcision). 
276.  See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 91, at 2.  
 277.  See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1233 (1989). See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring 
the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 474 (1990). 
278.  Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 21. 
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only women who suffer economic abuse, but may also benefit men, 
women, and families at large. To recalibrate the power dynamic at the 
heart of economic abuse,279 economic and social insecurities must be 
addressed.280 Hierarchy-attenuating policies can destabilize hegemonic 
masculinity, unraveling the Gordian knot between hegemonic 
masculinity, control, and money. A responsive state would need to 
support men, women, and families in times of such transition. 
VI. EPILOGUE
Family law’s canon “reports that family law prioritizes sex equality 
and . . . has freed itself from its historical entanglements in subordination 
and injustice,” but scholars have long noted that family law’s roots 
continue to influence family relations.281 Courts have often and recently 
cited the end of coverture as the transformation of marriage from a male-
dominated institution to an institution that recognizes men and women as 
equals.282 Yet beyond formal legal recognition of men and women as 
equals lies a social, economic, and gendered reality.283 Recent marriage 
equality discourse in Obergefell v. Hodges284 focused primarily on the 
freedom to marry, but did not concern freedom within marriage.285 While 
Obergefell understandably celebrated the demise of coverture, courts will 
need to grapple with its “modern vestiges”286 going forward. Yet, the 
history of transformational change invoked in Obergefell offers some 
hope for transformation in intimate relation jurisprudence.287 
This Article illustrated the existence of economic abuse between 
spouses and has shown that the legal system has yet to deal with it in a 
comprehensive and significant manner. This neglect is not gender-
neutral.288 A feminist approach to law must shed light on those places 
where the law has not been adjusted to cater to the life circumstances 
279.  Baker, supra note 242, at 57. 
280.  Cahn & Ni Aoláin, supra note 135, at 7. 
281.  HASDAY, supra note 51, at 5. 
282.  Id. at 101–02. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 70 –71, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (No. 14-556). 
283.  See Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own, supra note 110. 
284.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 282.   
285.  See Colker, supra note 16, at 386–87. See also Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s 
Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919 (2016) (explaining that Obergefell rests largely on 
liberty rather than equality).  
286.  Id. at 411. 
 287.  Mayeri, supra note 66, at 127. Mayeri was referring to a different transformation while 
critiquing the Court’s affirmation of marriage supremacy.   
288.  CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
PATRIARCHAL RELATIONS 221 (1984). 
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predominantly experienced by women,289 and therefore the 
conceptualization of economic abuse into the legal discourse is a feminist 
process. Nonetheless, this Article has used masculinities theory in order 
to analyze the phenomenon; to understand hegemonic masculinity’s 
relationship to the activation of economic abuse; and to understand how 
historical, social, and legal norms constitute a fertile ground for economic 
abuse (without derogating obviously from the personal responsibility of 
the men wielding it). 
The law has a long history of establishing men as the breadwinners 
and women as the financial dependents on the males in their families.290 
Even today, hegemonic masculinity rests significantly on the ability to 
provide for a family; and the ability to provide for a family, in turn, 
informs economic control of the family.291 Even in this postmodern era 
which is thriving with new forms of families, such as same-sex couples, 
single-parent families, or blended families, important aspects of the 
traditional family have remained firmly intact for heterosexual couples, 
especially male domination of economic aspects of the family.292 Power 
remains unequal even in this new, more egalitarian age. It is, nonetheless, 
a product of history, law, and society, and it is therefore transformable. 
 289.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 96–105 (1989); 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 142, at 54–56. 
290.  Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own, supra note 110, at 575. 
 291.  FINEMAN, supra note 82, at 151; ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS
EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 276–77 (1976); STACEY, supra note 75, at 8.  
292.  HASDAY, supra note 51, at 97–132. 
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